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Abstract
Considered the last ‘stepping stone’ before Australia, Indo-
nesia plays an important role in immobilising secondary 
movements of asylum seekers and refugees in Southeast 
Asia. While migration scholarship has dedicated substantial 
attention to immigration detention and the deplorable liv-
ing conditions inside immigration detention centres (IDCs), 
this article explores “alternatives to detention” (ATD) in two 
Indonesian localities: the city of Makassar and the province 
of Aceh. Seeking to contribute to a critical examination of 
ATD more generally, this article examines individual free-
dom, mobility, mechanisms of care and aid provision, pro-
tection of rights, self-determination, and matters of personal 
safety. The article illustrates the remaining limitations and 
the lack of rights that asylum seekers and refugees in Indo-
nesia continue to face outside of IDCs. A durable solution, 
in the form of integration, is not available to asylum seekers 
and refugees, as they are prevented from integrating into the 
local host societies, and their social and economic mobil-
ity remains widely restricted. Yet at the same time, despite 
more physical mobility in ATD, asylum seekers and refugees 
remain contained within Indonesia as their onward move-
ment remains deterred as well.
Résumé
Considérée comme le dernier tremplin vers l’Australie, 
l’Indonésie joue un rôle important pour bloquer les 
mouvements secondaires des demandeurs d’asile et des 
réfugiés en Asie du Sud-Est. Tandis que les études sur la 
migration se sont beaucoup focalisées sur la la détention 
des immigrants et les conditions de vie déplorables dans les 
les centres de détention des immigrants (CDI), cet article 
explore des alternatives à la détention (AD) à deux endroits 
d’Indonésie : la ville de Makassar et la province d’Aceh. À 
des fins plus générales de contribution critique sur les CDI, 
il étudie la liberté individuelle, la mobilité, les mécanismes 
de soins et les dispositions d’aides, la protection des droits, 
l’autodétermination, et les questions de sécurité personnelle. 
Il illustre enfin les limites persistantes et le manque de droits 
auxquels font toujours face, en Indonésie, les demandeurs 
d’asile et les réfugiés à l’extérieur des CDI. Du fait qu’on les 
empêche de s’intégrer aux sociétés hôtes locales et que leur 
mobilité sociale et économique est extrêmement limitée, on 
ne leur offre pas de solution durable sous la forme d’une 
intégration. En dépit d’une certaine mobilité physique dans 
le cadre des AD, les demandeurs d’asile et les réfugiés restent 
confinés à l’intérieur de l’Indonésie du fait qu’on les décour-
age également d’aller de l’avant.
Introduction
In June 2013, Human Rights Watch published a damn-
ing report entitled Barely Surviving: Detention, Abuse, and 
Neglect of Migrant Children in Indonesia, which highlighted 
the situation of hundreds of incarcerated minor asylum 
seekers and refugees in immigration detention centres 
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(IDCs); it also provided insights into the more general situ-
ation of almost 13,000 adult asylum seekers and refugees in 
Indonesia at the time.1 Primary responsibility for the lack of 
protection, maltreatment, and abuse in detention was attrib-
uted to the Indonesian government,2 but Human Rights 
Watch attributed secondary responsibility to the Australian 
government, which had long provided substantial funding 
to the Indonesian immigration detention system in order to 
deter the irregular onward movement of those immobilized 
people to Australia.3 Exactly one year later, the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
introduced a new global strategy, “Beyond Detention 2014–
2019,” to help governments cease detaining asylum seekers 
and refugees. The three main goals agreed under this strat-
egy are “(1) to end the detention of children; (2) to ensure 
that alternatives to detention (ATD) are available in law and 
implemented in practice; and (3) to improve conditions 
of detention, where detention is necessary and unavoid-
able, to meet international standards.”4 To assist Indonesia 
implement the strategy, a National Action Plan was drawn 
up with relevant Indonesian ministries, the UNHCR office 
in Jakarta and its local implementing partners, the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Indonesian 
Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM).5
In light of growing recognition of detention’s harm to 
detainees as well as its high financial costs, governments 
around the world are exploring more cost-effective and 
humane options for accommodating immobilized asylum 
seekers and refugees.6 ATD rose to greater international atten-
tion with the launch of UNHCR’s “Beyond Detention” strategy 
in 2015. An outcome of intense lobbying by NGOs, such as the 
International Detention Coalition (a global network of more 
than 300 NGOs) and Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network 
(APPRN), the strategy picks up the call for accommodating 
asylum seekers in residential housing, open transit facilities, 
and shelters in local communities while their immigration 
statuses are being processed.7 Indonesian NGOs are involved 
in these NGO networks, but they were not the driving forces 
behind the campaigns. 
There is no single legal definition of what determines ATD. 
While some scholars understand ATD to be a range of policies 
and practices employed by sovereign states to better manage 
immigration falling short of incarceration,8 Sampson et al. 
have suggested a number of minimum standards, including 
respect for fundamental rights, meeting basic needs, legal 
status and documentation, legal advice and interpretation, 
fair and timely case resolution,  and regular review of place-
ment decisions, which must be met in order qualify as ATD.9 
This article presents ATD as the physical and spatial lodging 
of asylum seekers and refugees outside prison-like IDCs. 
Although seen as improvements over closed institutions, 
ATD also need further review before wide-scale adoption; 
however, the little critical research into ATD that has been 
conducted thus far has been confined to countries of the 
Global North.10
Three years after the launch of the “Beyond Detention” 
strategy, the article explores living conditions in Indonesian 
ATD in order to document what the gradual shift from IDCs 
to ATD has brought for those affected by it. While recent 
migration scholarship has produced a large critical body of 
literature on detention,11 with considerable attention also 
dedicated to Indonesian IDCs,12 this article questions their 
“alternative” dimension based on my encounters with a 
specific empirical reality in the field. This shift of attention 
from IDCs to ATDis significant in light of the shifting ratio 
of detained and undetained asylum seekers and refugees in 
Indonesia.13 
The main argument put forward here is that ATD in Indo-
nesia can be conceptualized as another form of containment, 
albeit with greater mobility. From this perspective, ATD mask 
a larger problem, one that might even be more complex than 
the release from IDCs, which is the lack of local integration 
for the asylum seekers and refugees currently in Indonesia. 
Local integration constitutes a durable solution, next to 
resettlement or voluntary repatriation. In analyzing my find-
ings I have opted to apply the concept of carceral mobility, 
which I borrow from Moran, Piacentini, and Pallot.14 Moran, 
Piacentini, and Pallot provide a useful starting point through 
challenging the widespread assumption of “mobility as an 
expression of power,” and that “mobility is connected with 
autonomy … and, ultimately, ‘freedom.’”15 Their study on 
contemporary prisoner transport in the Russian Federation 
highlights in particular the punitive control and the carceral 
practices inherent in (coerced) mobility of prisoners. 
Seeking to further explore carceral aspects of mobility, I 
pay attention to asylum seekers’ and refugees’ limited attain-
ment of legal rights as well as their insufficient economic 
and social integration that, if it was granted, would allow 
for a standard of living similar to that of the local popula-
tion and wider social and cultural acceptance. I demonstrate 
that despite greater physical mobility, asylum seekers and 
refugees in ATD lack the freedom to live a self-determined 
life because there is an absence of crucial rights that could 
otherwise enhance their economic and social mobility. On 
the basis of my analysis, the carceral mobility is character-
ized by an absence of rights insofar as those residing in 
ATD are prohibited from taking up work and have difficulty 
accessing education, therefore fostering dependency on aid 
and services. Despite high levels of control and surveillance, 
in the form of curfews, limited visiting rights, restricted 
radius of mobility, and regular police checks, I found a lack 
of physical safety for the ATD residents, as they fear attacks 
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and encroachments by locals. ATD sustain zones of contain-
ment with semi-permeable boundaries that on the one hand 
provide little safety to asylum seekers and refugees, but on 
the other hand prevent meaningful integration. 
In writing this article I pursue four goals. First, the empiri-
cal insights into temporary accommodation outside IDCs help 
produce a more holistic picture of the day-to-day reality faced 
by asylum seekers and refugees stuck in Indonesia.16 Second, I 
contribute to the overall debate on ATD beyond the Indonesian 
context, particularly in regard to individual freedom, mobility, 
the mechanisms of care, rights, and protection, and issues of 
personal safety, health, and well-being of asylum seekers and 
refugees in protracted transit situations. Third, I document 
the persistent indecision of the Indonesian government on its 
approach to detention and ATD. I argue that the Indonesian 
government has repeatedly opted for inconsistent and ad hoc 
approaches: it vacillates amongst a permissive laissez-faire 
attitude that allowed thousands of asylum seekers to pass 
through Indonesia freely; a hasty and heavy-handed use of 
incarceration in an overcrowded IDC system in keeping with 
the interests of Australian government funders, and a prag-
matic shift to ATD. Fourth, I explore issues of personal safety 
and well-being of asylum seekers in Indonesian ATD and their 
effect on desired onward journeys. Here I argue that while the 
shift from IDCs to ATD is deemed more humane, it sustains 
the prevention of onward movement while mitigating against 
effective and long-term integration of asylum seekers and 
refugees into Indonesian society. 
This article is informed by long-term fieldwork in Indone-
sia between 2010 and 2016, a period that saw abrupt changes 
and gradual shifts in the Indonesian asylum-seeker regime. 
During many short trips (usually one month long) and a 
longer stint (eight months), I have (re)visited six IDCs (Kali-
deres, Pontianak, Tanjung Pinang, Kupang, Semarang, and 
Makassar), four refugee camps (Aceh), three NGO shelters 
for underage asylum-seekers, a private and a state-owned 
orphanage (both in Jakarta), more than a dozen community 
shelters (Makassar, Medan, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta), and 
many self-funded lodgings, such as shared apartments and 
doss-houses (Jakarta and Puncak).17 As there is no coher-
ent policy for accommodating transiting asylum seekers and 
refugees in Indonesia, it was important to gain an overview 
of the variety of housing options, in regard to configuration, 
capacity, regulations or provisions. With no “typical” ATD in 
place, I have decided to compare two sites: community shel-
ters in Makassar and makeshift camps in Aceh. Given that 
asylum seekers and refugees based in Jakarta and Puncak 
have received the bulk of attention by scholars and journal-
ists, it is important to provide some snapshots on residency 
areas usually considered peripheries within the Indonesian 
archipelago. While the first site is considered a “best practice 
example” by the Indonesian government and therefore gives 
an impression of ATD at their best, the other is an ad hoc 
example, so provides a useful comparison of how contin-
gency affects ATD. Both sites depict difficulties relevant to 
other ATD. Only two cases can be examined (largely because 
of word limitations) to provide a more detailed sense of 
material conditions and everyday routines in those sites. The 
broader claims about ATD, however, draw on the wider eth-
nographic research within and amongst residents of the full 
suite of ATD operating in Indonesia. 
The ATD in Makassar came into existence in 2011, when 
IOM started using two hotels for housing asylum seekers and 
refugees who could not be placed in the local IDC. From then 
on, the number of ATD grew steadily; in June 2013 there were 
already 10 ATD facilities in use and 12 in January 2015.18 In 
April 2016, 2,036 asylum seekers and refugees were living in 
Makassar, of which 1,165 were under IOM care. While most of 
them lived in one of the 14 ATD in the city and its outskirts, 
196 under IOM care were still held in an IDC in Makassar.19 
Unlike in other cities, no women and children were detained 
in the IDC in Makassar.20 In general, Makassar enjoyed a 
fairly high reputation amongst asylum seekers who decided 
to self-report to the migration authorities there,21 regardless 
of repeated public statements by the Makassar immigra-
tion authorities that they did not want to receive any more 
asylum seekers and refugees in either the IDC or the ATD. 
Despite these challenges, the ATD in Makassar is seen as a 
success by the central government, because in February 2016, 
the governor of South Sulawesi received an award from the 
Indonesian minister of law and human rights for superior 
efforts of the Makassar immigration authorities in “supervis-
ing foreigners.”22 
The refugee camps in Aceh, in contrast, result from ad 
hoc emergency responses and were—as makeshift solu-
tions—extended over time, making the camps in Aceh ATD 
by chance. Generally speaking, Indonesia had not seen any 
refugee camps since the Indochinese refugees were housed 
on the island of Galang in the late 1970s until the mid-1990s, 
so the Aceh camps were a novelty.23 In May 2015, 1,807 asy-
lum seekers of the persecuted Rohingya ethnic and religious 
minority from Myanmar became stranded in Aceh, Suma-
tra’s northernmost province.24 There are no IDCs in Aceh 
to accommodate them, and IDCs in other provinces were 
already overcrowded. Even though in previous years other 
Rohingya had come to Indonesia and faced the usual deten-
tion procedures, this new group was handled differently.25 
The Indonesian government issued an unprecedented 
ultimatum that it would tolerate the Rohingya’s presence 
only on the condition that the UNHCR arrange resettlement 
or repatriation within one year.26 Since resettlement has 
been minimal so far, Indonesia has yet to find a solution 
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for the remaining Rohingya beyond the one-year deadline 
that ended in May 2016. Local governments in Aceh were 
explicitly prohibited from using local budgets to cater for the 
Rohingya (apart from initial emergency efforts);27 however, 
the IOM and some 20 Indonesian NGOs were permitted to 
establish and administer camps for the Rohingya in Aceh. 
Conditions in the camps varied but were below the stand-
ards for sanitation, hygiene, and safety in other ATD. As the 
camps were intended for short-term use only, the building 
materials were generally of low quality. Compared to the 
community shelters in Makassar, which were deemed exem-
plary, the makeshift camps in Aceh ranked at the lower end 
of the ATD spectrum. 
During fieldwork I spoke to more than 90 asylum seek-
ers and refugees (mostly men) during their detention, but 
usually after their release from an IDC, and in some cases 
before their “voluntary” surrender to an IDC. The research 
was complemented by recurrent interviews with representa-
tives from the UNHCR and IOM, Indonesian and non-Indone-
sians members of NGOs (e.g., SUAKA, Jesuit Refugee Service, 
Church World Service, Aksi Cepat Tanggap), and with many 
low- to mid-level Indonesian migration and police officers in 
charge of handling asylum seekers and refugees. I observed a 
number of focus group discussions and coordination meet-
ings involving high-level representatives from the special 
ministerial task force for handling people smuggling, asy-
lum seekers and refugees (Desk Penangan Penyelundupan 
Manusia, Pengungsi dan Pencari Suaka, P2MP2S). I formally 
interviewed representatives of central and local government 
on their tasks in handling asylum seekers and refugees. I 
conducted all interviews in Indonesian or English. Interpret-
ers were not used at any point. I complement the observa-
tions from the field with Indonesian media reports, which 
are often overlooked in research that focuses on Indonesia.
Asylum Seekers in Indonesia: From Transit to 
Protracted Stay
Indonesia’s growing interest in policing irregular migration 
is not mirrored by an interest in refugee protection. Indone-
sia remains reluctant to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
largely because of the obligation entailed to provide for the 
permanent integration into Indonesia of recognized refugees. 
Defending this position, Indonesian government representa-
tives often claim that Indonesia already complies “with the 
principle and spirit of the 1951 Convention.”28 Although this 
claim is questionable, Indonesia has allowed the UNHCR to 
process asylum-seeker claims on its territory and the IOM 
to provide a wide range of services to asylum seekers and 
refugees.29
The asylum-seeker and refugee population in Indone-
sia is small, especially by comparison with that of with its 
neighbours.30 At the end of March 2016, 7,381 asylum seekers 
and 6,467 refugees were registered with the UNHCR in Jakarta. 
Of these 13,848 people, 10,253 were male and 3,595 were 
female; 3,552 were under 18, including 643 unaccompanied 
or separated children.31 UNHCR statistics reveal that almost a 
third of the current population of asylum seekers and refu-
gees (4,270 persons, including 3,182 asylum seekers and 1,088 
refugees, of whom 845 were female and 846 were children, 
with 138 being unaccompanied and separated children) were 
detained in IDCs and temporary quarantine facilities under 
immigration supervision. Indonesia has 13 permanent IDCs 
and 20 temporary detention facilities in 12 provinces, with a 
combined capacity for 3,000 people. Because of overcrowd-
ing in IDCs and unwillingness to build additional centres, 
Indonesia has opted for ATD. IOM statistics in April 2016 
indicate that 4,132 asylum seekers and refugees (47 per cent 
of all those under its care) were hosted in ATD. In 2016, there 
were 42 community shelters and housing facilities located 
in six Indonesian provinces, often in or near the cities that 
have IDCs, such as Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya, and Makas-
sar. Indonesian authorities estimated that in October 2015 at 
least 5,000 asylum seekers and refugees were renting private 
accommodation in Puncak and Jakarta.32 While precise 
numbers vary according to different agencies and authori-
ties, most asylum seekers and refugees are now living outside 
IDCs, either in ATD or in independent accommodation. 
The reasons many asylum seekers and refugees still remain 
in IDCs, despite the UNHCR’s “Beyond Detention” strategy, 
are to be found not only in the insufficient numbers of ATD 
in Indonesia, but also in the large number of people who sur-
render themselves to IDCs.33 Between 2014 and 2015, nearly 
4,000 asylum seekers and refugees reported themselves to 
immigration authorities, seeking to be detained because they 
could no longer afford to support themselves independently 
outside the detention system.34 This development does 
not necessarily undermine the UNHCR “Beyond Detention” 
strategy; rather it is a perverse component of it. In order to 
be placed in an ATD, asylum seekers and refugees must be 
registered by Indonesian immigration authorities, and the 
most efficient way to register is to be placed in temporary 
immigration detention, as I explain later in more detail. 
While between 2014 and 2016 fewer people arrived in 
Indonesia than in 2010–13, more and more asylum seekers 
and refugees are staying in Indonesia for longer periods 
of time. The reasons are twofold. First, opportunities for 
onward movement (refugee resettlement to third countries) 
have decreased since Australia cut its resettlement quota 
from Indonesia dramatically in November 2014, and no 
other potential resettlement countries have stepped in to 
compensate. Second, irregular onward migration to Aus-
tralia also decreased after Australia adopted more restrictive 
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policies in September 2013.35 Australia closed all options for 
asylum seekers arriving by boat to be processed in and reset-
tled to Australia. In some cases, those asylum seekers are for-
cibly returned to Indonesia (or Vietnam and Sri Lanka in the 
case of nationals of those countries subjected to “enhanced 
screening” and found not to have valid protection claims). 
Others are directed to offshore detention centres in Nauru 
and Manus Island (Papua New Guinea). Although these 
policies deny asylum seekers access to Australia, they have 
not stemmed the flow of asylum seekers within the wider 
Asia-Pacific region. The many conflicts in Asia, North Africa, 
and the Middle East still force many people to leave their 
homelands in search of safer places to live. Persecuted and 
forcibly displaced people continue to arrive in countries such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia, many seeking transit to potential 
resettlement countries. As a result, Indonesia has become a 
reluctant host to asylum seekers and refugees whose “transit” 
through Indonesia is likely to entail a prolonged and poten-
tially indefinite stay.36 
In 2011, before the number of asylum seekers crossing 
from Indonesia to Australia peaked, Patrialis Akbar, Indo-
nesian minister for law and human rights, stated that exist-
ing IDCs were sufficient to meet demand.37 At that time, a 
number of state-owned and state-operated IDCs around 
Indonesia (such as those in Tanjung Pinang and Semarang) 
had been refurbished and extended with the help of Austral-
ian funding. Even though the number of registered asylum 
seekers and refugees has increased since then, Indonesia has 
given no indication that it will build additional permanent 
IDCs, relying instead on temporary detention facilities and 
ATD. The reasons are complex, entailing, first of all, domestic 
administrative and fiscal hurdles for the establishment of 
new IDCs, as asylum seekers’ issues are currently not a high 
priority issue and more importantly, Indonesian–Austral-
ian unsteady relations over security and migration issues.38 
Extending IDC with or without Australian funding would be 
seen as too much a favour for Australia. However, Indonesia’s 
reluctance to enlarge its IDC system predated the UNHCR’s 
global “Beyond Detention” strategy. Out of pragmatic neces-
sity, Indonesia had already made use of IOM-administered 
and Australian funded ATD for more than a decade.39 By its 
own account, “for the past 13 years, IOM Indonesia has been 
at the forefront in supporting the Indonesian Government’s 
continuing efforts to promote alternatives to detention for 
refugees and smuggled migrants.”40 Although ATD emerged 
as a temporary “solution,” they are increasingly becoming 
permanent sites of accommodation for asylum seekers and 
refugees awaiting resettlement.
One of the more perverse bureaucratic features of the ad 
hoc arrangements applying to asylum seekers and refugees 
is that the only pathway into an IOM-managed ATD is via 
temporary detention. Some Indonesian migration officials 
earn extra money from asylum seekers, by making them pay 
to be detained in (and released from) an IDC or simply steal-
ing from their belongings.41 There is no official short-cut to 
direct placement in one of the IOM’s community shelters or, 
in turn, to receipt of IOM “care” in those shelters, which may 
include for instance, limited cash payments, access to rec-
reational activities and psycho-social treatments. Upon their 
release from an IDC, asylum seekers and refugees have no 
choice as to which ATD they are placed in. Also, they must 
sign a declaration of compliance, which includes restrictions 
on mobility and housing, prohibitions on visiting airport and 
seaports, biweekly reporting requirements, requests to com-
ply with Indonesian law and display “cooperative behaviour 
in the neighbourhood.”42 Although at first glance these rules 
appear straightforward and reasonable, at least to those flu-
ent in English, they leave open a number of questions, such as 
how big the specific designated area is or what “cooperative 
behaviour” means in practice. Leaving certain rules rather 
vague provides authorities with more discretionary power. 
High levels of discretion, if not arbitrary implementation of 
rules, by immigration officials and other authorities evoke 
hyper-cautiousness and sometimes fear among the ATD resi-
dents. Compliance with the many regulations is enhanced 
by the mere risk of readmission into an IDC. This prospect 
hangs over the ATD enrolees like the sword of Damocles, 
and therefore the carceral mobility, as manifested in ATD, is 
rooted in the punitive quality of the IDC.
While many ATD have been enlarged in the initial phase 
of the “Beyond Detention” strategy, the implementation of 
consistent regulations for ATD throughout the country is 
yet to be achieved, until which time claims of unfairness 
and arbitrariness will likely persist among asylum seekers 
and refugees. On the visits to several ATD facilities, I found 
that conditions and rules varied widely, as did levels of free-
dom enjoyed. For example, in some ATD residents received 
monthly cash stipends of US$100, in others they did not. 
Those who did not receive cash to buy their own food were 
provided with catered meals, not very different from IDCs, 
which proved to be a source of ongoing frustration. Not only 
was the selection of those meals limited, but also the quality 
was poor. Without the right to decide for themselves what to 
eat and when over a protracted period of time, ATD residents 
are denied the very basic dignities of life and are subjected 
to other people’s taste, routine, and priorities. Not only do 
food provisions cause another loss of control of one’s life, but 
food provisions foster dependency. Therefore they are a tool 
for monitoring and disciplining ATD residents, as absentees 
are left out from the distribution and are eventually deregis-
tered from the ATD. The synergies between providing food 
assistance and monitoring asylum seekers are well-known 
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and also applied in other countries.43 I will now flesh out 
the living conditions in two ATD: the community shelters in 
Makassar and makeshift camps in Aceh.
Makassar: IOM-Funded Community Housing
While in Makassar in May 2015, I visited two centrally 
located ATD. The tall new buildings were distinct from other 
housing on the street. One building accommodated single 
males, and another was for families. In each case, either two 
single people or one family shared one room, but children 
over eight years old were supposed to have their own room. 
Each room consisted of two single beds or one double bed, a 
bathroom, and a small, carpeted, sitting area. Each room had 
air-conditioning, but no windows. Only some rooms had 
light through glass bricks. Power blackouts were frequent. 
One Indonesian security guard watched over the residents 
but did not object to my visit. 
The rules for living in the facility were printed in English, 
Indonesian, Arabic, and Farsi, and pinned next to the main 
door.44 Among them, driving vehicles, leaving Makassar, 
and receiving guests in one’s room is prohibited, a curfew is 
imposed, and political involvement is forbidden. Not only 
does the list indicate how subjective the rules can be, as “strict 
sanctions” are not spelled out, it also unveils the selectivity 
of the Indonesians, for example featuring heightened agita-
tion about “sexual misconduct” and other moral evils, such as 
gambling and night clubbing. The juxtaposition of “mak[ing] 
a scene” and “to be involved in political activities,” which 
could theoretically also cover protests against the UNHCR or 
the IOM, is comprehensible only when taking into account 
the common complaints from local host communities, which 
are usually coloured by moral panic and racist undertones. 
Although I could discover whether any ATD residents had 
been returned to the IDC in Makassar, the possibility was 
expressed in informal chats. Escapes from the ATD take place 
from time to time, but usually in small numbers.45
The greatest challenges, according to ATD residents, are 
the daily boredom and the uncertainty of whether and when 
they will be resettled. Women talked about tensions between 
individuals and families, and between parents and their 
children resulting from their ongoing frustration. Fights 
broke out occasionally among ATD residents.46 To pass the 
time, some men played football in the park or went to a gym. 
Some had organized their own English lessons. In inter-
views I found that most ATD residents kept the time they 
spent outside the facilities to a minimum and tried to avoid 
contact with the local community. According to them, the 
locals, who are Sunni Muslims, did not like the fact that they 
are Shia. ATD residents were told to not practise their faith 
publicly. Many of them had heard about anti-Shia incidents 
elsewhere in Indonesia.47 
In order to improve relations between the locals and the 
ATD residents and minimize tension, the local government in 
Makassar, in cooperation with the IOM and UNHCR, organ-
ized some information sessions (sosialisasi).48 While asylum 
seekers and refugees were told not to do “anything stupid, 
not to make noise in the streets at night and not to party 
when others are in the local mosque,” members of the local 
community were reminded to not “allow their daughters to 
dress up and keep a close eye on them” to prevent intimate 
friendships (pacaran).49 Furthermore, the local government 
initiated “cleaning Sundays,” in which locals and ATD inhab-
itants came together to clean the streets and sewage canals in 
their neighbourhood, after which they were provided with 
snacks and drinks. Members of the local administration 
hoped such orchestrated encounters would promote better 
relations and mutual responsibility for the area.50 Although 
meant to be a win-win for locals and refugees, the ATD resi-
dents felt this activity was another imposition on their lives. 
In order to avoid suspicions of being lazy, ungrateful refugees 
and to be perceived as good, compliant refugees they had to 
do “voluntary” work, which was represented as a reciprocal 
exchange, but it was in fact free labour for the local govern-
ment that did not incur any costs for hosting the asylum 
seekers and refugees. In the words of an ATD resident who 
participated in those “cleaning Sundays” semi-compliantly, 
“It’s not the Indonesian community that is providing for us 
here, it’s the UN and IOM; if I do something for the local com-
munity I expect something in return.”51 Although the local 
initiators were enthusiastic about the outcomes of these 
“cleaning Sundays,” they ceased soon after my departure.52
While IOM public relations materials emphasize the 
leisure and learning activities made available to ATD resi-
dents,53 such activities are relatively modest, and daily life 
appeared dreary. So far, only 22 children were allowed to 
attend a primary school in Makassar.54 The residents in the 
Makassar ATD could not cook for themselves but received 
catered meals three times a day. When I visited I saw many 
Styrofoam food containers unopened in the garbage bins. 
The people in this ATD did not receive a cash allowance, rely-
ing instead on monthly deliveries of toiletries, tea, sugar, cof-
fee, clothes, and so on. Most had no money for phone credit 
and internet access (crucial for staying in touch with families 
abroad), and resorted to selling some of their aid provisions 
to local Indonesians at less than market value. 
Makeshift Camps in Aceh 
I visited the four camps in Aceh twice, in November 2015 and 
in April 2016. By that time only 281 Rohingya, including 48 
minors, remained there.55 From the initial number of 1,807 
Rohingya, the UNHCR deemed only some 1,000 people eli-
gible for temporary protection in Aceh. By September 2015, 
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at least 642 Bangladeshi nationals who had initially claimed 
they were Rohingya had been “voluntarily” repatriated to 
Bangladesh.56 While in November 2015 some Rohingya 
still lived in tents, by April 2016 everybody was housed in 
barracks, some of them now in fact empty. According to 
press reports, most Rohingya absconded from the camps in 
order to reach Malaysia.57 Despite the shrinking numbers of 
Rohingya in Aceh, a new, more robust camp was opened in 
Langsa in April 2016, with room for 1,500 people, exceeding 
the number of remaining Rohingya.58 
The main service provider for the camps was the IOM, 
responsible for the supply of drinking water, sanitation, food, 
and health care.59 Unlike other ATD, the camps in Aceh 
saw a great involvement of NGOs. Even though most other 
asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia (Afghans, Paki-
stanis, and Somalis) are Muslim too, the plight of the Roh-
ingya spurred an unprecedented sense of Muslim solidarity 
amongst Indonesians. Many Indonesians gave their zakat 
(compulsory tax for Muslims) to Muslim NGOs involved in 
helping the Rohingya.60 Individuals also donated food and 
clothes or became volunteers. Aid and services delivered by 
NGOs included literacy programs, religious instruction, and 
skills training. In the camp in North Aceh, residents were 
provided with daily meals cooked by the villagers specifically 
employed for this task. Out of frustration, residents resorted 
to cooking secretly on open fires inside the wooden barracks. 
In all camps, Rohingya sold their donated mattresses, milk 
powder, shampoo, or soap to raise funds.61 
Local authorities in North Aceh complained about NGO 
interference that not only undermined security arrange-
ments but also was in conflict with rights provision.62 For 
example, an NGO arranged marriages between the Rohingya, 
including of underage girls, as they considered it inappro-
priate for unmarried men and women to live in the same 
camp.63 In a stand-off between that NGO and the local 
government, the state-employed guards quit their services 
for a period of time, resulting in break-ins into the depots 
where IOM and UNHCR stored aid provisions, and Rohingya 
absconded at night.64 More severely, in September 2015, 
four women alleged being raped during their arrest by locals 
following their attempted escape.65 The news caused panic 
and 200 residents stormed out of the camp, although most 
returned later.66 Amnesty International reported abuse and 
intimidation by local security staff, lack of protection from 
smugglers, as well as theft and beating of Rohingya by local 
gangs entering the camps.67
Members of NGOs and the local and central government 
have recognized the risk of tension between the Rohingya in 
the camps and the surrounding local population. Acehnese 
villagers, many of them very poor and with limited under-
standing of how the asylum seekers are handled, saw Rohingya 
being provided with goods and services that they themselves 
often yearn for.68 To reduce resentment, a number of infor-
mation sessions were conducted. For example, in radio pro-
grams locals could voice their complaints and receive proper 
information from a community councillor.69 In response to 
the extended stay of the remaining Rohingya in Aceh, local 
governments had to offer small compromises on basic edu-
cation and work. In March 2016, six Rohingya children were 
granted access to the local primary school in Langsa.70 Some 
new approaches, including refugees and local residents jointly 
raising livestock, are beginning to be implemented in the 
camp in North Aceh; it is too early to comment on the success 
of those non-remunerated employment schemes. 
Released from IDC, but Still Contained 
Living in a community shelter in Makassar and even in a 
makeshift camp in Aceh offers better living conditions than 
in prison-like IDCs. Instead of being confined in a small 
space, ADT residents have more freedom of movement, at 
least within a predetermined radius. Despite their greater 
mobility, they still face limitations, marginalization, and 
rights deprivation. Their placement in an ATD is still driven 
by containment and social segregation, thereby preventing 
any form of temporary or permanent integration. Again and 
again, the Indonesian government has made it clear that the 
only durable solutions for asylum seekers and refugees com-
ing to Indonesia are repatriation and resettlement, but not 
local integration. Thus the Indonesian ministry keeps urg-
ing the UNHCR to “act faster” on registering and assessing 
asylum claims, and finding a permanent solution for recog-
nized refugees anywhere else but Indonesia.71 By stressing 
that Indonesia with its population of more than 250 million 
is still a poor country that can hardly provide sufficient ser-
vices for its citizens, subsequent Indonesian governments 
have rejected responsibility to provide permanent protec-
tion for asylum seekers and refugees.72 Indonesian refugee 
rights activists, however, object to this argument. In their 
view the root problem “is not that Indonesia is a poor coun-
try,” but rather insufficient awareness, lack of political will, 
and absence of a proper legal framework.73 Nonetheless, the 
establishment of ATD serves the Indonesian government well, 
not only because it is even cheaper than the immigration 
detention system, but its more humane setting also saves 
the government from criticism for maltreatment of detained 
asylum seekers and refugees. On the basis of visits of sev-
eral ATD, however, I have encountered deficiencies, such as 
absence of basic rights, segregation, and lack of choice for 
self-determined living, that support the notion of carceral 
mobility, which I had conceptualized earlier as an alterna-
tive form of containment, albeit one with greater physical 
mobility. 
Volume 33 Refuge Number 2
39
First, although asylum seekers and refugees in ATD in 
Indonesia are subject to Indonesian law, they are often pre-
vented from exercising their rights. They face insufficient 
legal protection, as they tend to avoid state authorities, 
whom they view as predatory. The absence of basic rights, 
such as education and work, mean that ATD are not yet a 
panacea for asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia. As I 
have shown for the ATD in Aceh and Makassar, most asylum 
seeker and refugee children are still not allowed to attend 
local schools and must rely on the rudimentary and sporadic 
provision of language and literacy classes offered by IOM or 
NGOs. Moreover, the prohibition of work and the resulting 
inability to earn money legally controls not only the socio-
economic mobility of asylum seekers and refugees in ATD, 
but in fact prevents any form of integration within the wider 
Indonesian society. Both in Aceh and Makassar local gov-
ernments have experimented with forms of unremunerated 
work. In Makassar the women from the ATD were asked to 
sew traditional costumes and bags to exhibit at a local handi-
craft fair, but they were barred from selling their products.74 
In Aceh, stock-breeding is currently tested. Although cen-
tral government officials argue vehemently against proper 
working rights and thus temporary integration of refugees 
in Indonesia, such pragmatic employment options appear 
more practicable than the isolation of asylum seekers and 
refugees in ATD, where they depend on aid and services pro-
vided by IOM and NGOs. 
Second, similar to IDCs, ATD support their residents’ social 
isolation and segregation from the surrounding Indonesian 
communities, as they tend to be located on the outskirts of 
cities, in separate kampungs, or, if located more centrally, 
they are walled off.75 Minimal public attention is supposed 
to stem xenophobic backlashes. Negative public perceptions 
and repeated public complaints about ATD in general or alle-
gations of the cultural or sexual misbehaviour of individual 
asylum seekers and refugees have in some cases resulted in 
the permanent closure of shelters. As already noted, the pro-
vision of aid and services engenders negative perception and 
social jealousy among local Indonesian populations, as sum-
marized by one Acehnese: “They [the Rohingya] want eat, 
just eat …! They want sleep, just sleep …! Everything is pre-
pared for them …! No need to work …!”76 However, it seems 
that the segregation from public spheres is not only a strat-
egy chosen by the IOM and the local authorities to decrease 
tensions, but it is partly also self-imposed by asylum seek-
ers and refugees for safety. Particularly the events in Aceh 
showed the inability or unwillingness of Indonesian guards 
to protect vulnerable asylum seekers and refugees from 
(sexual) violence and theft. An Afghan refugee in Makassar 
who had been beaten up summarized the problem: “I can’t 
do anything about this [Indonesians beating up foreigners] 
because I enter[ed] Indonesia illegally. And when they beat 
us up, I can’t fight back.”77 Any involvement in brawls and 
other disturbances increases the risk of being returned to 
an IDC. Thus, many other precautionary steps adopted by 
ATD residents attest to their self-imposed invisibility, such as 
not practising their religion openly. As the snapshot from 
Makassar showed, Shia are particularly aware of the anti-
Shia sentiment and attacks.78 From this perspective, living 
in an Indonesian ATD bears a resemblance to what Brendese 
described as “vida encerrada,”79 not so much as in the neces-
sary clandestine nature of their existence as migrants who 
crossed the border illegally, but rather in the restrictions they 
impose upon themselves to avoid being conspicuous among 
potentially hostile hosts. 
Third, while ATD residents enjoy greater physical mobility 
than their IDC-imprisoned counterparts, they too are subject 
to restricted freedom of movement. Any violation of the 
“declaration of compliance,” a document every released asy-
lum seeker and refugee must sign, risks return to an IDC. ATD 
residents are closely monitored by immigration authorities, 
to whom they must report frequently to continue receiving 
aid and services. Reporting obligations require them to stay 
within a certain radius of their assigned location. Although 
many Rohingya in Aceh left clandestinely, only a few 
absconded from the ATD in Makassar.80 Without money they 
cannot go anywhere else in Indonesia or leave Indonesia by 
irregular means, so their (onward) mobility is circumvented 
tremendously. These limitations and dependencies make 
their mobility carceral. In fact, it appears that the newly 
gained freedoms of living in ATD are, in fact, paradoxical: 
in IDCs, entry is open to anybody who is arrested or surren-
ders, but the exit is blocked; in ATD it is the other way round, 
with the entry blocked to those who have not been referred 
to the ATD by immigration authorities, but the exit open, at 
least in theory. Those who leave the ATD have nowhere to go 
within Indonesia and risk destitution, exploitation, and re-
arrest and re-detention. Their carceral mobility means that 
although they are no longer incarcerated, they are stuck in a 
carceral archipelago.81 
Conclusion: Deterrence and Containment 
Continue
This article has questioned whether ATD in Indonesia offer 
a proper alternative to detention or whether they are sim-
ply arrangements for alternative detention in the sense of 
containment. During fieldwork and interviews with cur-
rent ATD residents in two ATD sites, I was interested in the 
lived experiences of asylum seekers and refugees, including 
aspects of their freedom; physical, social, and economic 
mobility; mechanisms for their care and aid provision; 
political, cultural, and religious rights to lead an active and 
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self-determined life; and matters of personal safety and 
well-being. 
The snapshots from the field have indicated that as a result 
of administrative discretion, inconsistency, general vulner-
ability, indignity, and lack of control over life, ATD in Indone-
sia render residents insecure and immobile and deny them 
rights. Post-detention life in an ATD does not alleviate the 
uncertainty of waiting, and the stress of a potential return 
to an IDC should not be underestimated. As in IDCs, asylum 
seekers and refugees in ATD are deprived of basic rights, 
such as access to education and work, and their freedom of 
religion is limited, especially for Shia. Whereas asylum seek-
ers in Europe are immobilized by being labelled as crimi-
nal border crossers and are, therefore, deprived of political 
rights during their journeys,82 asylum seekers and refugees 
in Indonesia are more likely to become contained through 
their dependency on aid and services. 
Although ATD are generally perceived as benign places, in 
fact the embodiment of more humane migration manage-
ment, which makes them an alternative to IDC, they are not a 
comprehensive alternative to the more holistic detention sys-
tems in place in Indonesia that seek to deter self-organized 
onward movements. The more humane accommodation 
in ATD does not annul the overall “containment”—as reset-
tlement options from Indonesia have been decreased and 
self-organized onward migration to Australia has been ruled 
out—nor “stuckedness,” which persists as there is no avenue 
for local integration. The indefinite nature of their stasis in 
transit in Indonesia, whether in ATDs or ATD, is perceived by 
these transiting asylum seekers as punitive and becomes in 
itself a powerful deterrent for potential future arrivals.83 The 
carceral mobility inherent in ATD is not only an unintended 
impact of poor and inadequate asylum regulation in Indo-
nesia, but also another means of deterrence, which prevents 
or limits unwanted cross-border movement into Australia. 
With these three deficiencies—absence of basic rights, seg-
regation, and lack of proper choices for self-determined 
living—ATD in Indonesia remain an effective tool of current 
containment and deterrence policies.
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